

# **Automated Tool and Method for System Safety Analysis:**

## **2009 Progress Report**

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**Abstract:** This report describes progress in 2009 on developing a unified, systematic, and semi-automated approach for extracting early information from requirements specifications and other documents, for system modeling, requirements validation, and safety analysis. Semi-automated extraction of data and generation of models and visualizations can save labor and schedule. Automated information extraction can improve the efficiency, consistency, repeatability, and completeness of modeling and analysis, and it can reduce the time spent reanalyzing when specifications and designs change. The Automated Tool and Method for System Safety Analysis project uses a linguistic analysis tool to extract key information from FMEAs and hazard reports. Model generation software in the Hazard Identification Tool integrates this information into visualizations of system architecture models. The model generation software maps extracted terms from text to elements of the model, by using criteria based on the Aerospace Ontology. The model is reused in system-level simulation, to dynamically evaluate the impact of failure modes on the executing system design.



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## Problem Statement

Unsafe system-software interactions are a major concern in the software safety community. As shown in Figure 1, operations and stresses in software can “activate” faults and influence failures in the controlled system or the environment. Likewise, operations and stresses in the controlled system or the environment can “activate” faults and influence failures in the software. Interacting cascades are possible. Early evaluation of software requirements and design will reduce system-software integration risks, by identifying relevant factors in complex controlled systems that are easily overlooked. It is also important to assess system failures and anomalous conditions that may challenge software in system integration testing.

Multiple independent analysis approaches are used to assure safety. NASA safety and risk analysts commonly produce and review failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) documents and the hazard reports that document hazard analyses. These two types of analysis are intended to be complementary, providing a more complete understanding of risks than either analysis alone would provide. FMEAs are produced bottom up from component failures, and identify the causes and impacts of the failure modes in phases of operation. Hazard analyses work from top mishap events down to analyzable hazards. Hazard reports include causes, controls that can be applied to each cause, and verifications for these controls. These two types of analysis should “meet in the middle”. Thus, it is useful to trace how entities and failures in one type of analysis map to entities and failures in the other. Terminology variants used by independent analysts make tracing difficult, and performing manual reviews is difficult when there are large numbers of documents. If developed early, models, visualizations, system simulation, and failure mode testing can help safety analysts identify gaps in requirements and safety analyses. This information is needed for better informed failure mitigation strategies. Without the use of such tools early in development, the probability increases that requirements-induced errors and hazards will propagate to subsequent development phases and into operations.

A unified, systematic, and automated approach is needed for extracting early information from requirements specifications and other documents, for system modeling, requirements validation, and safety analysis. Semi-automated extraction of data and generation of models and visualizations can save labor and schedule. Automated information extraction can improve the efficiency, consistency, repeatability, and completeness of modeling and analysis, and it can reduce the time spent reanalyzing when specifications and designs change.




Figure 1 – Concept of System-Software Interactions Related to Hazards



## Technical Approach

The Automated Tool and Method for System Safety Analysis project uses a linguistic analysis tool (Semantic Text Analysis Tool – STAT) to extract key information from FMEAs and hazard reports. Model generation software in the Hazard Identification Tool (HIT) integrates this information into visualizations of system architecture models. The primary sources of extractions are FMEA documents, which contain system descriptions, problem descriptions, and statements about connections and dependencies. Interface requirements documents (IRDs) also contain information on components and connections. The component-connection models are linked to text describing failures and failure causes in both FMEA worksheets and hazard reports. Thus, the visualized models summarize information scattered in three types of large document sets (FMEAs, IRDs, and hazard reports). The intent is to make it easier to review hazard paths and find redundant and missing links within and between types of analysis. Prototyping with documents produced prior to the NASA Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) Preliminary Design Review (PDR) shows how these visualizations can assist safety engineers in early evaluation of system requirements, preliminary designs, and safety analyses.

The model generation process creates a multi-level component connection model of the system. STAT derives information on the system parts hierarchy both from the organization of document sections that describe parts relationships and from parsed text that indicates part-whole relationships. STAT also extracts and parses text from document sections likely to contain statements about the connections between components and the resources transmitted across connections. For each model component or component connection, the source text excerpt and reference are extracted for use in the visualization. The extracted information is written in a structured form to xml files for use by the application that generates the visualization.

Visualizations of the models are automatic by-products of the model generation process (Figure 2 shows an example visualization). The primary sources of the models are parts hierarchies and component-connection information in FMEAs. In the graphical display or visualization on the left side of Figure 2, a mouse click on a component or connection will display the document citation (document title and worksheet number). On the right-hand side, a pop-up window shows some FMEA documentation for the “Initiator” components in the visualization. The pop-up window can also show information from the FMEA about the item, item function, failure modes and failure mode causes.

Figure 3 shows stages in constructing component connection models. STAT parses a natural language sentence from an IRD about the interaction between the Crew Module (CM) and Launch Abort System (LAS), producing the xml form containing the parsed sentence. The component-connection form at the bottom maps extracted terms from the sentence to elements of the component connection model, by using criteria based on Aerospace Ontology (AO) classes for physical objects and functions. The terms and hierarchical classes in the AO are used to reconcile terminology differences among documents and to filter out irrelevant information during model generation by HIT.

A system-level simulation was created from PDR documentation to model the Orion LAS and CM control avionics. This Virtual System Integration Laboratory (VSIL) provides a means of dynamically evaluating the impact of failure modes on the executing system design. Failure modes of safety plugs, Safe&Arm valves, initiators, thermal batteries, and electronic control signals can be used to evaluate system responses to such events. Orion system behavioral models in the VSIL are necessarily abstract due to lack of available design information and project scope.




Figure 2 – A Rocket Subsystem and FMEA Display for Initiators



Figure 3 – Interface Requirement, Parsed Sentence, and Form Indicating the Component Connection

# 2009 Progress

## Constellation Orion Cases

The main case for this project has been the Orion LAS pyrotechnics system. The CM Vehicle Management Computers connect to and control the Pyrotechnic Event Controllers (PECs) in the Remote Interface Unit. The PECs drive the LAS Pyrotechnics and control ignition of the LAS motors, including the Abort Motor (AM), Jettison Motor (JM) and Abort Control Motor (ACM). A network of Flexible Confined Detonating Cords (FCDCs) connect many of the components that support ignition. In 2009, this work was extended to include another Orion case, the propulsion subsystem of the Service Module (SM). This subsystem was selected because the propulsion subsystem data book for the Orion PDR included well developed FMEAs and hazard reports for extraction. Documents for other subsystems were developed as well. Challenges arising from the SM case included new formats and text styles in the FMEA worksheets and hazard reports.

## Improvements in Information Extraction and Display

In 2009, STAT capabilities were extended to handle more complex sentences and extract model information from hazard report text. Components, subcomponents, connections, and faults and failures can be extracted from Cause Descriptions and Cause Controls fields. Currently, this capability is not being fully used, but can be integrated in the future. The current hazard information pop-up windows highlight all instances of text in a hazard report that correspond to a FMEA model component. Improvements were also made to the automatic layout of the visualization and in model generation.

An example from the LAS pyrotechnics subsystem is shown in Figure 4. Green highlighting shows the components that are referenced in hazard reports. Highlighting and pop-up windows make it easy to see which FMEA components are mentioned in corresponding hazard reports. It is also easy to compare FMEA and hazard report information with side-by-side pop ups. Figure 5 shows a scrollable pop-up window with hazard report references to Through Bulkhead Initiator 2 (TBI-2 in Figure 4). In Figure 5, one of the cause controls involves use of rigorous design for minimum risk (DFMR) processes to achieve fault tolerance.




Figure 4 – LAS Pyrotechnics Model Fragment and FMEA Pop-up Window for AM TBI-2






Figure 5 – Pop-up Window with Hazard Reports that Refer to TBIs

## ***Software Safety Engineer Evaluations***

Safety engineers reviewed visualizations in two evaluation sessions. The visualizations were for the Orion LAS pyrotechnics case. The reviews were positive; the engineers found that the organized information made it easier to inspect for problems and missing information in the documents. The engineers noted these advantages:

- Putting all the information related to a system component or a connection in one integrated visualization can reveal what information is redundant, inaccurate, or out of date. For example, there were several instances where more than one FMEA worksheet described the same component, possibly because the document had more than one author or because an outdated FMEA worksheet was not deleted when a new one was added. Such redundant FMEAs are noticeable in the pop-up information displays.
- Visualizing connected components helps the safety engineer check for components that have no outputs to any other component and components that have insufficient inputs. Either case may be an indication of omissions in system design or, more likely, the system documentation. The visualization also helps the engineer check whether the architecture fulfills requirements.
- Combining extractions from three types of documents helps build a more complete picture of the system. It helps to highlight terminology disagreements and missing and inconsistent information.
- References to specific information in the source documents for each component or connection are easily accessible.

## ***Model Reuse Study***

The STAT and HIT application suite can output an xml file containing the components, connections, and other properties of the system architecture model for use in other applications. The xml output function uses a specification of properties of the model to output, how to access them in the model, and the form they should take in the xml file. The specification facilitates updating and customizing information output for other uses.

A study was conducted to determine how other types of aerospace models can benefit from the types of information that can be extracted with the automated tools in this project. The study examined information requirements for functional fault models in the Testability Engineering and Maintenance System (TEAMS) tool and Finite State Machine (FSM) behavior models. It was determined that while the techniques used in the generation of FSM and TEAMS models cannot be completely automated, HIT models can be extended to include much of the necessary information used as inputs. Reusable model information includes:

- Component hierarchy and component-connection architecture - system models, configurations and phases
- Functions and actions of components
- Component modes/states and transitions - operating and failure modes, state transitions and triggers
- Faults and hazards, disabled functions, actions and transitions
- Instrumentation and key value constraints

## ***Virtual System Integration Laboratory Simulation Model***

The LAS VSIL simulator development has been completed to a functional state. The CM VMC commands and receives status from LAS pyrotechnics. The VSIL component hierarchy comprises the functional blocks that are involved in the LAS decision logic and execution of a launch abort sequence. VSIL parts include CEV and LAS avionics, pyrotechnic separators for LAS and CM, avionics connections to the pyrotechnics, AM, ACM, JM, the thrusters for each motor, valve assembly and control system, igniter assemblies, canard, fairing, spacecraft adapter, ground systems, mission systems, and communication network node. All essential LAS pyrotechnics parts from a system diagram have been modeled. Tests have been written to verify nominal VSIL functionality. Figure 6 shows an example output from a single test group in the test result file after verification testing.

```
Test 2: LAS Safe/Arm Valve Tests

Step 2a. Verify Safe/Arm Valve Initial State == SAFE
  Abort Motor Valve Status == SAFE: +++ PASS +++
  Jettison Motor Valve Status == SAFE: +++ PASS +++

Step 2b. Verify SA Valves switch to ARMED State under
command
  VMC commanding both SA Valves to ARMED State...
  Abort Motor Valve Status == ARMED: +++ PASS +++
  Jettison Motor Valve Status == ARMED: +++ PASS +++

Step 2c. Verify SA Valves switch to SAFE State under
command
  VMC commanding both SA Valves to SAFE State...
  Abort Motor Valve Status == SAFE: +++ PASS +++
  Jettison Motor Valve Status == SAFE: +++ PASS +++

Test 2 Final Result: +++ PASSED +++
```

Figure 6 –Example from VSIL Test Result File

Early testing in a VSIL complements FMEA by helping safety analysts to dynamically verify the effects of component failures on the system design. Progress has been made toward automating the process of translating failure modes identified in the FMEAs into a collection of failure mode test files. The VSIL model reuses the HIT xml model file to parse and extract failure mode identified and analyzed in the FMEAs, for testing in the VSIL simulation. These files serve as frameworks for developing failure mode tests, with direct pointers to component instances. This approach eliminates transcription errors and takes half the time of manual test framework generation.

Since the VSIL was developed from information in the requirements and design documentation, the names of the model components sometimes differ from the names used in the FMEA documents. In order to use information extracted from the FMEAs, an xml file was manually created to map FMEA document nomenclature to VSIL component nomenclature. To support efficient scaling of automated failure mode test framework generation, some coding progress has been made to provide for the automatic generation of this map file.

## 2010 Milestones

- Q2     Complete and evaluate visualization for safety engineers  
       Complete automated VSIL failure mode test framework generation
- Q3     Complete path analysis algorithms and evaluation  
       Complete VSIL user guide and test method documentation  
       Manage and compare model versions when source documents change  
       Complete enhanced version of integrated tool suite
- Q4     Software Assurance Symposium Presentations and Demonstration.  
       Complete project software source files and documentation and deliver on CDs.  
       Complete evaluations and final methods document.  
       Complete project analysis results files or reports to Orion S&MA customer  
       Complete project Final Report.

## Papers and Publications

Malin, J. T., Millward, C. , Schwarz, H. A., Gomez, F., Throop, D. R., and Thronesbery, C. "Linguistic Text Mining for Problem Reports," 2009 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, San Antonio, TX, October 2009, 1578-1583.

Malin, J. T., Fleming, L., Thronesbery, C., Throop, D. R., and Bennett, T. "Integrated Visualization of Information from Requirements, Safety Analyses and Hazard Reports," submitted to 28th International System Safety Conference.